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The Legal Status of the
Psychologist in the Courtroom
by Michael L. Perlin
n the practice of law, just as in the practice of otherprofessions or trades, it is often the mores and cus-
toms which deserve the attention usually paid to the
written rules of substance and procedure. Although
thousands of words are written about the subtle
points of a significant court decision or statutory revi-
sion, usually limited analysis is given to what can be
termed the "socialization of the law."
A discussion of the legal status of the psychologist
in the courtroom should begin with the premise that
the phrase legal status encompasses at least three is-
sues: the legal status of the psychologist as defined by
case law (i.e., when he or she can give expert tes-
timony); the legal roles which a psychologist can fill
(i.e., the kinds of cases in which he or she can tes-
tify); and the social status of the psychologist in the
courtroom (i.e., how he or she is viewed by the
judge, the jury, the parties, other experts and other
psychologists themselves). Although case law is now
becoming relatively uniform and the scope of witness
roles is widening, it is the social status of psycholo-
gists in the courtroom - a question largely ignored -
which is probably the most important of these three
topics. I
Jenkins Establishes Legal Status of Psychologists
Although a few early cases held that a properly
qualified psychologist could testify in a criminal trial
on questions involving mental condition or compe-
tency to stand trial 2 or in accident disability cases on
questions of extent of neurological impairment 3 it
was not until the 1962 decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals in Jenkins v. United States4
that the psychologist's legal status was given firm
grounding.
In Jenkins, a criminal case in which the defendant
on trial for housebreaking with intent to assault raised
the insanity defense, the trial judge had ordered the
jury to disregard the testimony of defense psycholo-
gists that the defendant "had a mental disease" when
he committed the crimes in question because "'a psy-
chologist is not competent to give a medical opinion
as to a mental disease or defect." ' Following the
jury's conviction, however, the court of appeals re-
versed and remanded the matter for a new trial based
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on a series of errors, including that the ruling by the
trial judge was incorrect, since "some psychologists
are qualified to render expert testimony in the field of
mental disorder. '
6
Judge David L. Bazelon, speaking for a sharply di-
vided court, noted that the appropriate test was
"whether the opinion offered will be likely to aid the
trier in the search for truth."17 The answer to this test
will not "depend upon [the witness'] claim to the title
'psychologist,' "8 the court warned. Rather, the de-
termination must depend "upon the nature and extent
of his knowledge." 9 While psychologists otherwise
employed in areas such as personnel administration
or industrial relations might not qualify to testify as to
"mental disease or defect," a psychologist with a
doctorate in clinical psychology who has had a psy-
chiatric hospital internship and/or completed an
American Psychological Association-approved
graduate training program and/or is board certified
might properly testify. 10
As indicated, the opinion was not unanimous. In a
special concurring opinion, Judge (now Chief Justice)
Warren Burger criticized Judge Bazelon's opinion for
its alleged "[failure] to give adequate guidance as to
the scope and nature of the inquiry" on remand. 1' He
listed seven major areas of concern, such as the
scope of the specific psychologist's clinical educa-
tion in "physiological and medical subjects," his abil-
ity to "[prescribe] or [supervise] treatment of mental
patients," and the meaning of "clinical experi-
ence,' 1 2 which should be covered.' 3 Two other
judges also dissented, urging the court to accept the
position of amicus curiae American Psychiatric As-
sociation, which had argued that psychologists should
not be allowed to qualify as experts. 14 According to
the dissenters, the majority should have listened to
the "wise counsel from the only undisputed experts
now at work in the area of medical illness of the
mind."1
Following Jenkins - a case which, by the way,
met with nearly unanimous critical endorsement in
the scholarly legal journals16 - virtually every major
criminal decision has echoed its language, 1 7 thus
strengthening the psychologist's "legal status." Al-
though at least one state's highest court has suggested
that a psychologist is "professionally inferior" to
medical doctors, 18 recent decisions have approved of
the reasoning of the Jenkins court. Some decisions
have allowed the admission of testimony where the
witness's "training, experience, information and per-
sonal observation" of the defendant 19 satisfied the
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"nature and extent of his knowledge," a test
suggested by Judge Bazelon in Jenkins, 2 0 while others
have denied its admissibility in cases where, for
example, the erstwhile witness was a "psychology
technician" with a bachelor's degree and less than a
year's work experience. 2' The language of a Wiscon-
sin court on this point is pertinent:
[Ihf a person has qualifications in a field, he may
testify within his area of competency. As the
frontiers of knowledge are pushed back, we find
it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize
many areas of knowledge with exclusiveness. It
is the particular qualifications of the witness in
relation to the particular issue which should con-
trol rather than the label of a profession or
trade. 22
The language in cases of this sort is not merely hor-
tatory. In Illinois, for instance, courts have been me-
ticulous in examining and evaluating the specific cre-
dentials of witnesses sought to be produced in a
series of cases2 3 in accordance with the Jenkins
guidelines.
Doors Opened to Admission
of Psychological Testimony
In addition to extending psychological testimony
beyond the scope of criminal responsibility issues to
encompass cases involving issues such as incompe-
tency to stand trial,2 4 the Jenkins line has signifi-
cantly expanded psychologists' role in the courtroom
in negligence/automobile accident cases that involve
accuracy of personality tests2 5 and presence of or-
ganic brain disease. 26 In a Pennsylvania case involv-
ing organic brain damage, 27 after citing Jenkins with
approval,2" the court went one step further and,
based on the testimony of a consulting neurosurgeon
in the case and what it characterized as "present
medical and psychological practice," 29 found that tes-
timony of "non-medical practitioners may be not only
desirable but necessary. "30
But this trend is not unanimous. Maryland recently
rejected another attempt to liberalize its rules on ad-
missibility, choosing instead to limit psychological
testimony to interpretations of psychological tests
(e.g., WAIS, Rorschach, Bender-Gestalt) and to ex-
clude testimony as to causes of psychological de-
ficiencies.3'
Jenkins and its progeny, then, literally opened the
doors to the admission of psychological testimony in
many legal areas. Psychologists now commonly tes-
tify as expert witnesses in civil commitment matters
involving questions of retardation, acceptability of
treatment involving behavior therapy and appropri-
ateness of placements. 32 They are also increasingly
involved in such issues as employment discrimina-
tion,33 juvenile placements,3 4 accuracy in evaluation
of eyewitness testimony,35 special education assign-
ments,3 6 effects of bilingualism on children,37 post-
sentencing disposition, 8 extent of neurological in-
jury,3 9 community standards in obscenity pros-
ecutions,40 trademark infringements and fraudulent
advertising suits. 4' Even more importantly, perhaps,
psychologists are beginning to testify in class actions
involving such fundamental issues as right to educa-
tion,4 2 right to habilitation, 4' and right to vote. 44 Such
testimony continually expands the legal influence of
psychologists. According to psychologist Cameron
Fincher, if the psychological community wishes to
evince a "consistent concern with the social, cultural
and humanistic issues as well as the professional and
technical problems, ' 45 then it must critically involve
itself in these roles.
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of the
use of psychological testimony is the now-famous
Pennhurst case.46 There, psychologists testified on a
full range of issues before the court, including educa-
tion, training, care, *habilitation, staffing, restraints,
psychopharmacological problems, abuse, and avail-
ability of alternative facilities.47 This testimony was
crucial in shaping the court's ground-breaking opinion
that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
"prohibit[ed] the segregation of the retarded in an iso-
lated institution such as Pennhurst where habilitation
does. not measure up to minimally adequate stan-
dards, ' 48 and "immediate steps [must] be taken to
remove the retarded residents from Pennhurst '" 49
commensurate with the exercise of "great caution
and care." 50 Involvement in this sort of case is telling
evidence of the sort of "social, cultural and humanis-
tic [concern]" 5' referred to and urged by Dr.
Fincher.
At the same time, however, the pertinency of the
simple truism, suggested in an article on courtroom
psychiatry by attorney Bernard Diamond and psychi-
atrist David Louisell, that "the psychological sci-
ences differ from the biological sciences in that the
subject matter of the former is not visible ' 52 is even
more applicable to a discussion of forensic psychol-
ogy and the role of the courtroom psychologist. What
are often viewed as the "excesses" of flamboyant
expert witnesses in public spectacles such as the
Hearst or Ruby trials5 3 quickly become transformed
into sins visited upon all expert witnesses. Papers are
regularly published denying the need for involvement
of "adversarial" experts in the legal adversary pro-
cess,5 4 direly forecasting the inevitable prostitution of
the profession,55 questioning the compatability of
psychology, psychiatry and the courts, 56 and recom-
mending that experts only become involved on an
amicus (friend of the court) or so-called impartial
witnesses level. 57 Although these positions have been
more than adequately responded to by lawyers 58 and
psychiatrists,5 9 a backlash phenomenon is clearly
present.60
Psychologists Viewed as "Second-Class Experts"
Beyond this, however, lurks an even more disturb-
ing problem for forensic psychologists. Not only must
they contend with the same basic antipathy in the
courtroom facing psychiatrists,6' they must also con-
tend with what is perceived as a "second-class ex-
pert" status when compared by judge or jury to med-
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ical experts. Thus, a basic legal text points out that [them] always as 'Mister.' in marked contrast to the
"a favorite trick of cross-examination is to bring out consistent and appropriate use of the title 'Doc-
the lack of medical education of the clinical psychol- tor." "I One of the post-Jenkins decisions notes, for
ogist . . in a voice oozing [with] incredulity or sar- example, that the trial court had asked the
casm." 6 2 Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that psychologist-witness. "You have never dissected a
psychologists may sometimes be effectively baited by cadaver, have you'?64 In another more recent case,
attorneys "indirectlly] attempt[ing] to question [their] in an attempt to discredit a clinical psychologist who
qualifications and competence . . by addressing had testified as a defense witness, the prosecutor ap-
Study shows psychologists' testimony is "first rate"
The following is excerpted from a paper deliv-
ered at the 1979 American Psychology-Law Soci-
ety meeting by clinical psychologists Dr. Norman
G. Poythress, Jr., and Dr. Russell Petrella. Both
work for the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in Ann
Arbo4), Michigan, which handles forensic referrals
from the district and circuit courts throughout the
state regarding issues of competency to stand trial
and criminal responsibility. Its staff includes psy-
chiatrists, social workers and psychologists.
Though the nonmedical mental health pro-
fessionals are gaining parity with psychiatrists in
terms of their legal status (i.e., admissibility to tes-
tify as "experts"), Michael Perlin points out that
nonpsychiatric experts may suffer from decreased
social status in the eyes of the judge or jury -
they may be perceived as "second-rate" experts.
Psychiatrists may be presumed, .based on the fact
of medical training or on other untested assump-
tions, to do more thorough or higher quality work
than nonmedical examiners. While reasoned argu-
ments have asserted that none of the mental health
professions has foiensic expertise not shared by
the others, to our knowledge there have been no
empirical studies to date comparing the various
disciplines in terms of the quality 'of forensic
eviluations.
The results of our three studies address the issue
of the thoroughness and quality of forensic exami-
nations performed by medical versus nonmedical
mental health examiners and the issue of whether
the trier of fact perceives the psychologist as a
"sec0ond-rate" expert.
In the first study, we randomly selected clinical
evaluations of defendants referred for competency
to stand trial or criminal responsibility which. had
been completed between August, 1975, and Sep-
tember, 1978. These reports, done by psychia-
trists, psychologists and social workers, *were
scrutinized regarding the thoroughness of the
evaluation as measured by the amount of effort
and information reflected in the casebook.
Since a longer report is not necessarily a higher
quality report, we undertook a second study to ad-
dress the issue of the quality of work performed by
the various mental health disciplines. A "blind"
sample of the reports from the first study were
rated and ranked on qualitative factors by various
legal professionals -- a circuit court judge, a pro-
secuting attorney and a law school professor.
In the third study, we utilized records of courtappearance and testimony maintained at the Fo-
rensic Center and looked at the outcome of those
cases in which the defendant asserted the insanity
defense. In these cases, the testimony of a Foren-
sic Center psychologist was matched against an
* expert or battery of experts that included medical
or psychiatric personnel.
The purpose of the three-study investigation was
-to test the assumption that the psychiatrists do
more thorough or higher quality work. The results
obtained demonstrate quite convincingly that this
is a false assumption. There is no evidence to
suggest that psychiatrists do higher quality work
on any of the variables employed. To the contrary,
psychiatrists' reports were consistently found to be
shorter than those prepared by psychologists and
social workers. Also the quality of the psycholo-
gists' and social workers' reports were consistently
rated as equal to or better than the psychiatrists'
reports. Thus, the psychologist and social worker
status as "second rate'" experts is unfounded whenone evaluates the actual work they produce.
This 'study firmly supports the current trend to
utilize nonmedical mental health professionals for
court related evaliiations. Although. the results of
the present study are limited by the small number
of judges employed, one cannot ignore its implica-
tions. In the opinion of variotis legal experts, the
evaluations completed by professionals other than
psychiatrists were in no way second rate. Addi-
tional data demonstrated that in actual trial situa-
tions, psychologists' opinions regarding legal in-
sanity were adhered' to in 82 percent of the cases
when a medical expert offered opposing testimony.
These findings on a practical level have signifi-
cant economic implications, since psychiatric
"time" is traditionally more expensive. The re-
sults suggest that the courts could obtain essen-
tially the same product, and possibly a superior
one, at less cost by utilizing nonmedical experts.
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pealed to the jury to disregard the witness's interpre-
tation of a projective test:
Ladies and gentlemen, then we come to that ink
blot. . . . Fourteen responses and four of them
turned out to be anatomical things - hearts or
whatever it happened to be. Is there something
unusual about that? Is a man crazy when he sees
a heart or something else four times. .. ? After
all, they are just blots of ink. Is a man crazy
when he sees them? And how about that last
one, that rocket one. He says he sees a rocket
going off. I asked him, Doctor, was there any
rocket fired during that period of time that might
stick in a man's brain and might suggest it to
him? The doctor doesn't know, but there is
something explosive about a personality if he
sees a rocket on a little ink blot.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, there is not much I
can say about that; I am not an expert. . . . But I
can say one thing; that it is a jury decision. It is
your province. It is your function to take that
evidence and weigh that evidence and decide
whether what the doctor said as far as you are
concerned made any sense at all. 65
In Jenkins, itself, in fact, a courtroom observer
pointed out that during the course of a psychologist's
testimony, the presiding trial judge "literally threw a
deck of projective cards onto the floor."66 Finally, a
Jenkins analysis concluded by asking rhetorically:
[Wlhat significance will the jury attach to the de-
fense psychologist's testimony when confronted
with the conflicting testimony of the state's psy-
chiatrist? Will recitation to the jury of the psy-
chiatrist's qualifications, which will include a
medical degree, have any prejudicial effect on
the defendant who produces a psychologist?
[Emphasis added. ]67
The treatment of the problem and answers to these
questions must be dealt with openly and completely
by forensic psychologists. They must confront the
reasons why they have been treated as second-class
citizens in the court and why they sometimes see
themselves in that role.
One tool in the psychologist's arsenal may be
created by the legislatures on a state-by-state basis. I
am referring to a strong privilege statute. In this re-
gard, Pennsylvania law is clear and explicit:
A person licensed as a psychologist under the
provisions of this act cannot, without the written
consent of his client, be examined in a civil or
criminal action as to any information acquired in
the course of his professional services in behalf
of the client. The confidential relations and
communication between a psychologist and his
client are on the same basis as those provided by
law between an attorney and client, and nothing
in this act shall be construed to require any such
privileged communication to be disclosed.68
In Pennsylvania, then, the psychologist's legal
status is a direct function of the strength of the psy-
chologists' lobbying force in the statehouse, and the
second-class expert argument is inappropriate. Take,
for example, a Pittsburgh case in which a psychiatrist
had been held in contempt for refusing to release psy-
chiatric records of a patient to the court in a juvenile
delinquency matter involving the patient's son. Al-
though that had been the trial court's ruling, the con-
tempt citation was reversed by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court69 on the grounds that such disclosure
would have violated the patient's right to privacy,70
because the information in question was obtained
.'within the context of a psychotherapist-patient rela-
tionship." 7' Interestingly, this analysis was only
necessary because, in Pennsylvania, the doctor-
patient privilege statute -7 2 was not as broad as the
psychologist-client statute. 73
Forensic psychologists must also be concerned
with the forensic psychiatrists who are still uncom-
fortable about the newcomers' involvement, which is
seen in some quarters as usurpation. Thus, in the
case where the prosecution said, "After all, they are
just blots of ink," the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion filed an amicus brief clearly labeling such fo-
rensic psychologists as '.laymen" in relation to the
diagnosis of "mental illness or defects." 7 4 According
to the eminent Professor of Law and Psychiatry
Richard Allen, the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's ultimate objective is "'quite clear: reversal of
Judge Bazelon's decision in Jenkins ."7 This spectre
must be a serious subject of consideration for the
forensic psychologist.
It is clear that organized psychiatry is choosing to
wage its war against organized psychology on many
fronts, most notably in defending against psycholo-
gists' challenge of third-party payment plans based on
"freedom of choice" grounds. 76 Although this is not
a "courtroom" issue per se, its significance should
not be understated.
Social Status a Reflection of Self-Perceptions
The genesis of the "second-class expert" attitude
cannot be laid solely, or even, perhaps, predominantly,
at the feet of the legal or psychiatric profession. This
social status can be seen as a reflection on the self-
perceptions held by many psychologists of their po-
tential courtroom role. Although it was a lawyer who
noted that the traditional limitation in courtroom par-
ticipation "comes not only from the law, but also
from the inhibitions of psychologists, ' 7 7 it is clearly
very often the "fault" of the psychologists them-
selves that their forensic role has been so truncated.
Indeed, psychiatrist Louisell's observation some
twenty years ago that "psychologists . . . often seem
to display an undue hesitancy, amounting almost to
fear, to taking the witness stand," '7 8 is still all too
valid in many instances. 79
Douglas Sargent, a psychiatrist, has noted that a
forensic psychiatrist is "annoyed by the limitations
which legal procedures place on his testimony, impa-
tient with the stilted rituals of courtroom etiquette,
intrigued by the law's archaic language." This re-
sponse, he says, creates an "unfortunate polarization
of attitudes . . . [leading to] a hostile parody of the
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truth."-8 0 The substitution of psychologist for psychi-
atrist in that sentence would similarly ring true.
In addition, forensic psychologists must confront
the fact that they cannot "behave in the courtroom as
though the issues were settled." 8' Transcripts some-
times reveal forensic psychological witnesses whose
demeanors in important, otherwise well-prepared,
serious criminal cases range from obstinate to conde-
scending to patronizing to omniscient.12 In the ver-
nacular, some forensic psychologists must "clean up
their act."
Psychologists have become aware that they must
learn how to deal with specific courtroom gambits if
they are to survive on the witness stand. 83 Thus, the
heralded Competency Screening Index, prepared
by the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry in con-
junction with the National Institute of Mental Health,
establishes a sentence-completion test for the purpose
of "'quickly screening defendants" to make recom-
mendations as to their competency to stand trial.8 4 It
is geared to determine whether an individual defen-
dant meets the three-pronged, common-law test for
competency (ability to cooperate with counsel, un-
derstand nature of proceedings, understand conse-
quences of proceedings), and, in fact, may effectively
do so.8 5 A witness, however, who administers and
then testifies to the results of a test such as this must
be aware of, and must be able to deal with, the pit-
falls of probing cross-examination, a skeptical judge,
and, on occasion, an incredulous jury.
One more point must be made. Although "pro-
psychologist" courts have generally taken the posi-
tion that "the qualification of an expert has histori-
cally been a matter not of licensure, but of experi-
ence,8 6 the whole area of licensure is now subject to
attack from consumer groups, economists and politi-
cal scientists. They charge that licensing perpetuates
"the return of medieval guilds," as it "significantly
increases the cost of professional services, decreases
the supply of practitioners, inhibits improvements in
the organization and delivery of services, stifles in-
novative training programs, and is discriminatory.
'
"87
Again, it will be necessary for thoughtful psycholo-
gists to deal with these charges.
Involvement on Three Levels
Although this picture looks gloomy, it should also
be encouraging to forensic psychologists. The cases
which I have referred to, especially the noncriminal
ones, are an opportunity for psychologists to push for
further involvement in the judicial process on at least
three separate levels.
First, the special assessment, testing and intel-
lectual/personality evaluation skills and techniques
possessed by clinical psychologists uniquely prepare
them for much courtroom work,88 such as in the
areas referred to earlier, as well as such newly emerg-
ing areas as ferreting out cultural test biases.8 9 They
will better be able to play this role if they become, in
the phrase of psychologist Stanley Brodsky and psy-
chiatrist Ames Robey, " courtroom-oriented" and
discard their usual "courtroom-unfamiliar" pose.9
Secondly, it is clear that testimony in civil rights
class actions gives the forensic psychologist a tre-
mendous opportunity "to contribute to social
change" 9 1 as an "advocate and facilitator,- 92 while
fulfilling his or her role as part of a "socially con-
cerned system." 93 To further promote this social-
change model, psychologists have begun to work with
lawyers, psychiatrists and former patients on such
endeavors as the Task Force Panel on Legal and
Ethical Issues of the President's Commission on
Mental Health, 94 and they have devoted full issues of
their professional journals to the "emerging interface
between law and psychology.'" 9 Such joint participa-
tion will only expand in the future.
As a corollary to both of these reasons, it should
also be pointed out that forensic psychologists are
remarkably successful when they go to court. In 70
percent of a group of cases studied, the verdict was in
favor of the side on which the psychologists tes-
tified. 96
Finally, it is clear that the courts are ready for the
forensic psychologist. As indicated earlier, legal bar-
riers to testimony have virtually disappeared. 97 One
commentator calls the clinical psychologist "worthy
of our consideration in the seeking of new and im-
proved trial techniques." 98 Another questions how
long the law can "lag behind scientific fact and com-
mon knowledge," 99 and a third argues that the psy-
chologist "can contribute in the courtroom toward a
better understanding of emotional illness."' 0 0 In-
terestingly, this final commentator points out how
psychology's struggle for acceptance as a scientific
and objective discipline familiarizes the psychologist
with ways to overcome the shortcomings of such
tools as projective tests and uniquely prepares him or
her for the rigors of cross-examination.' 0 ' It thus re-
mains only for the psychological community to
openly confront the reasons which have perpetuated
the anticourtroom bias and to educate all participants
in the litigation process to the need for and unique-
ness of appropriate psychological testimony. The re-
cent creation of an American Board of Forensic Psy-
chology can only aid in this educational process. 0 2
In a 1961 article, Norma Scheflen, a research psy-
chologist at Temple University, quoted the famous
law dean John Wigmore as saying, "Whenever the
psychologist is really ready for the courts, the courts
are ready for him."' 0 3 Although 19 years ago Dr.
Scheflen prophesized that "the time is now," it is un-
fortunate that history did not truly bear her out.
Perhaps now, finally, it will. N
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